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Understanding India’s Climate Agenda 
Noriko Fujiwara and Christian Egenhofer 
Introduction 
India has become an important partner for the EU in 
both multilateral and bilateral relations in a wide range 
of policy areas, including energy and climate change. 
Despite the strategic importance of this partnership, 
there may be insufficient awareness and understanding 
among EU stakeholders about India’s development 
needs and challenges, its high degree of vulnerability 
to the impacts of climate change and the actions it has 
taken domestically and in international fora to address 
climate change. The country is among those rapidly 
and steadily growing economies with an increasing 
share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, although it 
starts from a very low emissions base.  
While India forms part of the BASIC group (i.e. 
Brazil, South Africa, India and China), its socio-
economic parameters are much weaker than are those 
of the three other countries in the group. In a World 
Bank (2009) survey, India’s total GDP in 2008 was 
about US$1.2 trillion, which ranks it in twelfth place in 
the world compared with China’s third place with 
US$4.3 trillion. According to the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP, 2009), Indian per capita GDP (in 
terms of purchasing power parity or PPP) in 2007 was 
US$2,800 compared with US$5,400 for China and 
around US$9,800 for South Africa and US$9,600 for 
Brazil.1 India is the fifth largest GHG emitter in the 
world, accounting for approximately 4.7% of total 
global emissions, while China has become the largest 
emitter with 23% of total GHG emissions.2 In 2005, 
                                                     
1 As the EU’s poorest countries, the GDP per capita of Romania 
is US$12,000 and that of Bulgaria stands at around US$11,000.  
2 See the response by the Indian minister, Jairam Ramesh, in 
the Lok Sabha in “Minister of State of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (Shri Jairam Ramesh)”, Fifteenth 
Session, Vol. V, Third Session, 2009/1931 (Saka), No. 10, 3 
India’s total GHG emissions was 1,866 MtCO2e 
compared with China’s total emissions at 7,234 
MtCO2e; India’s per-capita GHG emissions was 1.7 
MtCO2e compared with China’s per-capita emissions 
at 5.5 MtCO2e.3 Furthermore, India has declared that 
its per capita emissions will never exceed those of the 
developed countries.4  
This paper discusses four key factors that help explain 
India’s current approach to tackling climate change: i) 
challenges in development, adaptation, energy use and 
GHG emissions; ii) domestic actions for mitigation 
and adaptation; iii) approaches to international 
negotiations; and iv) opportunities for a bilateral 
partnership with the EU. This Policy Brief is 
accompanied by a CEPS Working Document entitled 
The Political Economy of India’s Climate Agenda”.  
1. Key messages 
1.1 Challenges  
Poverty eradication through economic development 
is a national priority. Because India has a large 
population in which the majority is very poor, 
development is the means to move the population out 
of absolute poverty. Nearly 80% of India’s population 
of 1.1 billion, over 800 million persons, still survive on 
                                                                                          
December 2009(a), pp. 228-246 (retrieved from 
http://164.100.47.132/textofdebates/15/III/0312.pdf). 
3 Derived from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) 
Version 7.0, World Resources Institute, 2010 (retrieved from 
http://cait.wri.org/). 
4 See e.g. “Speech of Mr Jairam Ramesh, Minister of State 
(Independent Charge) for Environment & Forests, Government 
of India, at the High-Level Segment of the UN Climate 
Conference”, Copenhagen, 16 December 2009(b). See also 
Ramesh (2009a). 
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less than US$2 per day (Ghosh, 2009). With the goal 
of poverty eradication, India’s economy has been 
growing fast. The annual GDP growth rate was 6.7% 
in 2008–09 and is projected to be 6.5% in 2009–10 
(Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, 
2009). Yet, industrial and urban growth, the expansion 
of infrastructure and land-use changes resulting from 
an increasing population will not only lead to a net rise 
in GHG emissions but will also result in the loss of 
livelihoods among rural and forest communities.  
Economic development is also seen as the principal 
way to foster adaptation to climate change, since 
adaptive capacity is a function of the level of economic 
development of the rural and urban poor in India.  
Meanwhile, the country is highly vulnerable to 
climate-related events. First, this concern stems from 
the forecasted impacts of climate change on weather 
patterns, such as monsoons or cyclones. Consequential 
droughts or flooding (or both) because of changes in 
temperature and rainfall patterns will affect 
agriculture, which supports the livelihood of two out of 
every three Indians. Second, the receding of the 
Himalayan glaciers5 would affect water security across 
the entire northern part of the Indian subcontinent. 
Third, there are particularly sensitive areas that face 
risks of submergence. Along India’s long coastline, 
flooding from sea-level rise and storms of greater 
intensity could lead to widespread habitat loss and 
population displacement. Fourth and lastly, there is a 
risk of inflows of refugees from neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Bangladesh) that are even more prone to 
the repercussions of climate change.  
Energy is essential for development. Nearly half of 
the commercial, primary energy demand is met by coal 
but the share of coal in India’s total primary energy is 
about 38%.6 That is because non-commercial primary 
energy, such as biomass and cow dung, which is 
mainly used for household energy, accounts for about 
28% of the total primary energy consumption in India.7 
Coal accounted for 53.3% of the total installed utility-
based capacity of 156,000 MW at the end of 2009.8 The 
share of coal is followed by that for hydro, at 24.7%, 
gas at 10.5%, nuclear at 2.9% and oil at 0.9%.9 
Renewable energy sources (primarily wind) make up 
7.7% of the total installed capacity. Although the 
installed renewable capacity has recorded double-digit 
                                                     
5 There is some uncertainty in the data with respect to the rate 
at which the glaciers are expected to recede (see IPCC, 2010). 
6 See Planning Commission (2006 and 2008).  
7 Ibid. 
8 Derived from the Ministry of Power (source: CEA), 
Government of India, as of 31 December 2009 (retrieved from 
http://powermin.nic.in/JSP_SERVLETS/internal.jsp). 
9 Ibid. 
growth in recent years, its contribution to the primary 
energy mix remains at about 1%.10 
The principal energy-related challenge is access to 
energy, which has two distinct facets: ensuring energy 
supply to meet the growing demand of fuelling 
economic growth; and providing access to lifeline 
levels of clean commercial energy for the poor, chiefly 
electrification and cooking gas/kerosene. To date coal 
remains the most realistic option for power generation 
in the short to medium term even though an increase in 
the supply of coal is constrained by the ability to raise 
domestic production much beyond 7.8% annually in 
2008-09 (Coal Controller’s Organisation, 2009). A 
further constraint is the absence of both port and rail 
capacity for receiving and moving coal to feed the 
various power plants. More than 400 million persons 
do not have access to electricity and more than 700 
million depend on non-commercial biomass for 
cooking (Ghosh, 2009).11  
India’s future absolute emissions will grow. Existing 
model results show wide variance in the range of 
future increases in GHG emissions, depending 
primarily on the different assumptions regarding GDP 
growth, energy and carbon intensities. Projections by 
the Climate Modelling Forum (2009) rest on 
assumptions of a high, annual GDP growth rate 
averaged over the period up to 2030, ranging from 
7.5% (McKinsey) to 8.84% (NCAER) per annum. The 
past record, however, shows fluctuations in the annual 
growth rates for the last five years.12 
Economic modelling has shown that defining business-
as-usual (BAU) emission trajectories for a growing 
economy like India’s is difficult if not impossible. 
Thus, it will be a challenge to operationalise the 
suggestion that developing countries as a group should 
limit the growth of their emissions to 15-30% below 
BAU by 2020.  
With some degree of generalisation about the various 
modelling results and estimations of trajectories from 
the past trends (see the background document for 
further details), the following conclusions may be 
drawn solely for indicative purposes. (The authors first 
considered different modelling results and assumptions 
                                                     
10 Planning Commission (2006 and 2008). 
11 These figures vary (e.g. FIIA, 2009 quoted in Atteridge et 
al. 2009; IEA 2007). We should draw data from results of 
the national surveys, but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper (see also Sethi, 2010). 
12 The Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister 
(2009) reports the following annual GDP growth rates: 7.5% 
(2004–05), 9.5% (2005–06), 9.7% (2006–07), 9.0% (2007–08 
QE), and 6.7% (2008–09 Rev). The Economist quarterly data 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010) even reports a fall in the 
real GDP (percentage change, year on year) to 4.8% in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and 4.1% in the first quarter of 2009. 
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for the period up to 2032 – e.g. NCAER CGE, TERI 
MoEF, IRADe AA, TERI Poznan and McKinsey India 
Models (Climate Modelling Forum, 2009) – as well as 
the IEA’s World Energy Model (IEA, 2007), and then 
compared the forecasts against prior achievements, e.g. 
before 2005.) India’s total GHG emissions will grow 
from their current level but are likely to remain under 4 
Gt by 2030. Energy-related CO2 emissions will likely 
increase by around 3-4% per annum. These estimates 
are based on the assumptions of a GDP growth rate in 
the range of 6-7% per annum and a surge in primary 
energy demand of around 3.4% per annum in 2030.  
India is set on a low-carbon path with declining 
energy intensity, i.e. with the objective of 
decoupling economic growth and rises in GHG 
emissions. Both energy and GHG emission intensities 
will likely go down. India’s energy intensity showed 
an economy-wide decline in PPP terms by nearly 50% 
between 1980 and 2006 and a reduction in the 
industrial sector by more than 40% between 1990 and 
2005 (Rao et al., 2009). Moreover, India’s emissions 
intensity declined by 17.6% between 1990 and 2005.13 
All models show that energy intensity and CO2 (or 
CO2e) intensity are likely to continue falling (Climate 
Modelling Forum, 2009). 
India has made a voluntary pledge to reduce the 
emissions intensity of its GDP through domestic 
actions by 20-25% by 2020 from 2005 levels. This 
pledge excludes emissions from agriculture.  
There is no net subsidy in the energy sector as the 
total tax revenues collected from the energy sector far 
exceed the total energy subsidies. The energy sector is 
riddled with cross-subsidies, however, whereby one 
form of consumption subsidises another or one kind of 
fuel subsidises another. The budget of the central 
government funds less than 10% of the subsidies in 
cash.  Of the remaining subsidy flows, it funds about a 
third by way of oil bonds and asks the upstream and 
downstream companies to absorb the balance.14 A 
significant share of the subsidies is meant to help 
compensate under-recoveries by the oil marketing 
companies, which are not allowed to charge the import 
parity price for various petroleum products. Under-
recoveries are the difference between the import parity 
price of a petroleum product excluding all taxes and 
the net realisation by oil marketing companies net of 
all taxes. The large price difference between subsidised 
kerosene (Rs 9 per litre) and diesel (Rs 33 per litre) has 
led to a diversion of kerosene to adulterate diesel 
(Government of India, 2010). Consequently, an expert 
group on a petroleum-product pricing system has 
                                                     
13 See the response of J. Ramesh in the Lok Sabha (Ramesh, 
2009). 
14 See data from Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell 
(PRAC), http://ppac.org.in/default.htm; and analysis by the 
Planning Commission, http://planningcommission.nic.in/ 
recommended that the government let the market 
determine petrol and diesel prices while in the future 
raising the price of kerosene every year in step with the 
growth in per-capita agricultural GDP at a nominal 
cost figure (Government of India, 2010). This 
recommendation goes in line with the joint 
commitment by the G20 countries (including India) at 
the Pittsburgh summit in 2009: to phase out fossil fuel 
subsidies over the medium term while providing 
targeted support for the poorest. 
Under the Electricity Act of 2003, the state 
governments can provide subsidies to certain classes of 
consumers. Yet, the Act requires that the state 
governments fully compensate the utility companies. 
In reality, the utilities are unable to recover their full 
costs of supply owing to excessive transmission and 
distribution (T&D) and commercial losses (which 
include billing and collection losses). Almost 100% of 
electricity transmission in India is owned by the public 
sector while about 13% of electricity distribution in 
India is owned by the private sector (Kumar, 2009).15 
The net losses of the state government-owned utilities 
are thus subsidies for the electricity sector as a whole. 
These losses are incurred despite the fact that industrial 
and commercial power users and the larger domestic 
consumers pay more than the average cost of supply 
and cross-subsidise other consumers, such as 
agriculture and small households. Even if the 
commercial losses of the state-owned utilities are 
treated as net subsidies, the foregoing statement that 
the total taxes collected from the energy sector exceed 
its total subsidies (inclusive of under-recoveries) still 
holds. Because of the high level of cross-subsidies in 
the electricity sector, theft of electricity – which is 
classified as T&D or commercial loss – is quite 
common. Such theft is normally ascribed to the 
unorganised small and medium-sized industrial sector 
and commercial users of electricity. The electricity 
tariff for power used by the agricultural sector, which 
reportedly accounts for about 25% of electricity 
consumption (Singh, 2009), is heavily subsidised and 
is mostly unmetered.  
1.2 Domestic actions 
For a long time India has pursued domestic regulatory 
and funding policies focused on energy conservation 
and the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
These actions have been supported by legislation, 
regulation and tariff arrangements, e.g. the Energy 
Conservation Act in 2001, the New and Renewable 
Energy Policy in 2005 and the Integrated Energy 
                                                     
15 See A. Kumar (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, 
CERC), “Multi-year tariff and performance-based regulation”, 
Presentation at the “2nd Capacity Building Programme for 
Officers of Electricity Regulatory Commissions, Indian 
Institute of Technology, Kanpur, 3-8 August 2009. 
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Policy in 2006. Promotion of renewable energy can be 
traced back to the early 1990s.  
India has a number of publicly funded programmes to 
address both the direct impacts of climate change (e.g. 
through scientific research) and the reduction of its 
vulnerability to climate-related risks (e.g. through 
poverty eradication and rural development 
programmes). In 2006–07, the Indian government 
spent no less than 12% of its annual budget or 2.63% 
of GDP on these programmes.16  
In addition, the government intends to increase not 
only the quantity but also the quality of forest cover, 
thereby maintaining (at least in the next decade) the 
current level of carbon sequestration by forestry, which 
equates to 10% of annual GHG emissions.17 
India has launched a comprehensive and integrated 
strategy to implement domestic actions on climate 
change under its National Action Plan on Climate 
Change.18 This plan outlines policies and measures 
addressing mitigation and adaptation under eight 
“missions” through 2017. The national solar mission 
and that on enhanced energy efficiency are the most 
advanced ones to date on mitigating GHG emissions. 
• National solar mission. This mission plans to 
install solar-power generation capacity of 20,000 
MW by 2022. The 2006 Integrated Energy Policy 
(Planning Commission, 2006) forecasts a total 
peak demand of 323,000 MW, resulting in the need 
for 425,000 MW of installed capacity in 2021–22 
based on a GDP growth rate of 8% per annum. 
Specific proposed measures include mandatory 
renewable purchase obligations (a form of feed-in 
tariffs), mandatory solar heaters for buildings, the 
certification and rating of manufacturers, and soft 
loans.  
• National mission on enhanced energy efficiency. 
This mission is expected to reduce energy 
consumption by 5% and save about 100 million 
tonnes of CO2 annually by 2015. The mission 
consists of a number of initiatives including 
mandatory energy-efficiency standards, labelling 
for energy-saving appliances, building and vehicle 
standards, and domestic trading of energy-
efficiency certificates. The trading scheme is based 
on energy intensity and covers large energy-
intensive industries. 
                                                     
16 Data derived from the Indian government’s budget 
documents in Ghosh (2009).  
17 See the speech by Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, 
“PM’s address at the Inauguration of the 10th Delhi Sustainable 
Development Summit, New Delhi, 5 February 2010”. 
18 See Government of India, National Action Plan on Climate 
Change, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, New 
Delhi, 2008 (retrieved from 
http://pmindia.nic.in/climate_change.htm). 
Based on the National Action Plan on Climate Change 
and the 11th Five Year Plan (2007–12), the government 
is considering a set of nationally accountable 
mitigation outcomes and specific performance targets 
for sectors such as industry, energy, transport, 
agriculture, buildings and forestry for the years 2020 
and 2030. The planning commission recently set up an 
expert group composed of various stakeholders to 
prepare a strategy for a low-carbon economy before 
the start of the 12th Five Year Plan from April 2012.  
Since India has a federal governance system, states 
play an important role in implementing policies and 
measures, including those addressing energy and 
climate change. For example, the National Capital 
Territory of Delhi recently announced the first state 
action plan, which comprises 65 specific actions to 
address climate change, which is to be implemented 
across sectors by 2012. Several states have launched 
demand-side management programmes for energy 
efficiency. Under the 2003 Electricity Act, renewable 
purchase obligations have been introduced in 15 states, 
with the minimum percentage of renewable energy 
procurement varying across states from 1 to 10% in 
2008–09 (Kumar, 2009). The challenge is that 
renewable energy sources are not evenly spread across 
the states. Those states with greater potential for 
renewable energy sources could aim at higher levels in 
their renewable purchase obligations.  
1.3 Approaches to international 
negotiations 
Internationally, India calls for equitable allocation 
of and equitable access to atmospheric space and 
demands strict adherence to the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities in formulating the climate obligations of 
the Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. Other guiding 
principles for long-term cooperation include the right 
to development, full compensation for incremental 
mitigation costs and commitments to deep emission 
cuts to be taken on by Annex I countries for the second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.  
Prior to COP15 in Copenhagen, India defined three 
kinds of basic national interests: i) no legally-binding 
emissions reduction target; ii) no legally-binding 
peaking year for the country; and iii) a distinction 
between supported and unsupported mitigation actions 
by developing countries in respect of measurement, 
reporting and verification (MRV).  
For India, the main outcome of COP15 was the 
consensus to continue the dual-track negotiation 
process, one under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the other under the 
Kyoto Protocol. India’s voluntary pledge to reduce its 
emissions intensity was submitted in conformance with 
the relevant provisions of the UNFCCC, covering 
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voluntary national actions and policies (see above) as 
well as the provisions of the UNFCCC on the reporting 
of such actions and their review. The Indian 
submission does not refer to the Copenhagen Accord at 
all. 
India expects that the Copenhagen Accord will 
complement the dual-track negotiations. In addition, 
the country maintains that the Accord is neither legally 
binding nor does it mention a specific year for the 
peaking of developing country emissions. The Accord 
recognises that the time frame for peaking will be 
longer in developing countries, noting their priorities 
for development and poverty eradication. The need to 
limit the global temperature rise to less than 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels by the year 2050 is recognised in 
the context of equity and sustainable development, 
such that the right of developing countries to an 
equitable share in access to the global atmosphere can 
be ensured. In India’s view, a global goal should be 
expressed only in terms of a limit in the temperature 
rise, and not in terms of a quantified emissions 
reduction target that could lead to a binding 
commitment for developing countries. Lastly, the 
Accord ensures that developing countries’ mitigation 
actions will be subject to domestic MRV, and that 
respect for national sovereignty will be safeguarded 
under its provisions for international consultations and 
analysis of those domestic mitigation actions that are 
not attained through international finance and 
technology support. 
While maintaining their preference for the guiding 
principles, more recently the Indian government 
appears to have taken a more flexible and adaptive 
approach to several sticking points in international 
negotiations. One such example is a pledge to reduce 
emissions intensity in response to other countries’ 
unilateral announcements. Equally important is its 
willingness to engage in the coordination of positions 
with other major negotiating partners, traditionally the 
G77 and China, but increasingly the BASIC group as 
well. Together with the three other BASIC countries, 
India is seeking to ensure that climate change 
negotiations are finalised in accordance with the 
UNFCCC, the Bali Action Plan and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The government has also attempted to steer 
the negotiating process constructively by putting 
forward concrete proposals on items of special interest, 
especially on the technology mechanism, financing 
instrument and reductions in emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD plus). 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Bilateral partnership with the EU 
The EU and India have developed a joint work 
programme on energy, clean development and climate 
change under the bilateral cooperation framework. 
This programme aims at facilitating cooperation on 
both energy and climate change. A special focus is 
placed on R&D (including fusion energy and clean 
coal technology) as well as on renewables (especially 
solar energy). The programme does not provide a basis 
for concrete actions and thus progress in this sense has 
not been tangible. 
India might find useful some of the information 
emanating from the EU’s experience in adaptation 
cooperation with its partner countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and Pacific. Some of the risks of disaster 
these countries are facing as a result climate change, 
e.g. flooding on coastal areas, are also likely to be 
relevant to India.  
In the long term, an EU–Indian partnership could be 
developed into a more viable framework to address 
issues of fundamental concern to the respective parties. 
For example, it is important to focus on both 
international equity (which is a major concern for 
India) and intra-national equity, especially as it relates 
to access to resources and gender equality in this 
context (a concern for the EU). Any improvement in 
the livelihood of rural communities would lead to 
enhanced adaptive capacity – an area in which 
international cooperation could play a role. 
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research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.
